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Abstract 
This letter comments on the report “Forensic science in criminal courts: Ensuring scientific validity of feature-comparison 
methods” recently released by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST). The report   
advocates a procedure for evaluation of forensic evidence that is a two-stage procedure in which the first stage is 
“match”/“non-match” and the second stage is empirical assessment of sensitivity (correct acceptance) and false alarm 
(false acceptance) rates. Almost always, quantitative data from feature-comparison methods are continuously-valued and 
have within-source variability. We explain why a two-stage procedure is not appropriate for this type of data, and 
recommend use of statistical procedures which are appropriate. 
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Highlights 
 Feature-comparison methods produce continuously-valued data.
 The PCAST report advocates a two-stage procedure:
 (1) Dichotomise the data into “match” or “non-match”.
 (2) If “match”, assess correct acceptance and false acceptance rates.
 A better procedure would directly statistically model the continuously-valued data.
On September 20, 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) 
released their report: Forensic science in criminal courts: Ensuring scientific validity of feature-
comparison methods [1]. The report is rightly critical of “heterodox” “non-empirical” views ([1] §4.7, 
pp 59–63), and we wholeheartedly endorse the report’s call for forensic analysis methods to be 
empirically validated under casework conditions. We see the report as an important contribution to 
improving forensic science practice, and implementation of the report’s recommendations would 
constitute a major step forward. Our intention in this letter is to encourage an additional step forward. 
The PCAST report advocates a procedure for evaluating strength of evidence that is a substantial 
improvement over historical (and in many places current) practice, but further improvement is 
desirable and achievable. The report describes a procedure for quantifying “probative value”1 in 
which if a forensic practitioner declares a “match”,2 they also report the results of an empirical 
assessment of the probability of declaring a “match” if the questioned-source specimen came from 
the known source3 and the probability of declaring a “match” if the questioned-source specimen came 
from some other source.4 “The forensic examiner should report the overall false positive rate and 
1 what we call “strength of evidence” 
2 also called “proposed identification” in the report ([1] p 46) 
3 this would be the numerator for a likelihood ratio 
4 this would be the denominator for a likelihood ratio 
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sensitivity for the method established in the [empirical] studies of foundational validity and should 
demonstrate that the samples used in the foundational studies are relevant to the facts of the case.” 
([1] p 56). This is not an inappropriate procedure for quantifying strength of evidence if the data are 
discrete and have no within-source variability. 
If, however, the data are continuously-valued and have within-source variability, 5  then such a 
procedure discards information that could be exploited by more appropriate statistical procedures. 
Almost always, measurements made in “feature-comparison methods” will naturally result in 
continuously-valued data with within-source variability. For this type of data it is generally 
inappropriate to use a procedure which includes a stage that assesses “whether the features in an 
evidentiary sample and the features in a sample from a suspected source lie within a pre-specified 
measurement tolerance” ([1] p 48). Such a procedure suffers from a cliff-edge effect: A questioned-
source specimen which falls just above the threshold for “match” with the known-source sample and 
a questioned-source specimen which falls just below the threshold will result in very different 
conclusions as to the strength of the evidence, even though the difference between the two is 
negligible (the two specimens could in fact be from the same source, with the difference between 
them due to within-source variability). Also, a procedure that includes a “match”/“non-match” stage 
limits the strength-of-evidence conclusion to one of two possible values: A questioned-source 
specimen which vastly exceeds the threshold will be assessed as having exactly the same strength of 
evidence as a questioned-source specimen which just exceeds the threshold, even if the former should 
in theory constitute much stronger evidence than the latter. Mutatis mutandis for a specimen which 
falls just short of the threshold and one which falls far below the threshold. 
A more appropriate procedure would not include a “match”/“non-match” stage, would not use a 
threshold, and would instead directly assess two probabilities6 based on the continuously-valued data: 
(1) The probability of obtaining the measured properties of the questioned-source specimen had it 
come from the known source; versus (2) the probability of obtaining the measured properties of the 
questioned-source specimen had it come not from the known source but from some other source in 
the relevant population. The former is the numerator and the latter is the denominator of a likelihood 
ratio.7 There is a substantial body of literature describing and validating statistical procedures which 
work directly with continuously-valued data. Such statistical procedures would a priori be expected 
to have higher degrees of validity than those that include a “match”/“non-match” stage, and for 
particular applications actual performance can be compared via empirical tests (e.g., [2], [3]).  
                                                 
5 Within-source variability could be intrinsic or due to transfer or measurement processes. 
6 technically “likelihoods” 
7 There are multiple appropriate statistical procedures for calculating forensically interpretable likelihood ratios for 
continuously-valued data. The choice of the best procedure to use will depend on the details of the particular question to 
be answered in the case, the structure of the data to be analysed, and empirical testing of performance. To accurately 
represent many of these procedures would require more complex descriptions than the verbal description of a likelihood 
ratio just given in the main text. For simplicity, we only include the latter description in the present letter. 
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The PCAST report does not exhibit familiarity with the extensive existing literature on forensic 
inference and statistics, very little is referenced. The history of forensic science includes multiple 
examples in which procedures including a “match”/“non-match” stage were advocated and used, but 
which were subsequently replaced by procedures that more directly exploit continuously-valued 
measurements. Aitken & Taroni ([4] pp 10–11) and Foreman et al. ([5] pp 474–476) discuss examples 
from glass and DNA respectively. Additional publications critical of two-stage procedures in which 
the first stage is “match”/“non-match” include [6]–[16]. Progress toward “ensuring scientific validity 
of feature-comparison methods” will be quicker if forensic practitioners skip the “match”/“non-match” 
procedure advocated in the PCAST report and move directly to using validated statistical procedures 
which are appropriate for continuously-valued data.  
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